1. Bushfire evacuation

Satterley’s Bushfire Evacuation Plan relies 100% on the unplanned, non-existent, un-funded, East Link highway. Satterley assumes the Federal and State Governments will get their TAXPAYERS to pay for this 4-BILLION-DOLLAR road upgrade. Satterley ignores the fact that any future North Stoneville residents will have to be able to firstly safely escape the townsite, then drive 4-6 kms to reach the (currently non-existent) highway.

If the bushfire is burning towards Noth Stoneville from the north-east, (as per the 2021 Wooroloo Bushfire), the highway won’t be an evacuation option.

2. Omission of important simulation data
Satterley’s Bushfire Simulations omit the most dangerous and prevalent bushfire wind directions and highest fire danger from the west and from the east. The 2014 Stoneville-Parkerville-Mt Helena Bushfire started on a westerly wind with 57 homes destroyed. The 2021 Wooroloo Bushfire started with howling easterlies and destroyed 87 homes.

3. Unrealistic ember attack risk
Ember attacks can result in spot fires 3.5 kms or more ahead of the main bushfire front as was experienced and recorded during the 2021 Wooroloo bushfire. In the Satterley bushfire simulation modelling spotting of only 500 m was used. This severely limits the predicted speed of advance of the bushfires simulated in the modelling and creates the illusion that there is more time to evacuate an area.

4. Unrealistic Bushfire Scenario 

Satterley’s Bushfire Simulation is based on their belief that ALL of North Stoneville’s residents will choose to evacuate, and then drive their cars calmly away from the bushfire zone at a cruisy 60-kmh.

Evidence shows up to 40% of people stay and defend their property. That means 1,200 North Stoneville people staying on-site during a full-scale bushfire emergency – creating a potentially massive high-risk rescue effort by (mostly) Volunteer Brigade Fire Fighters.

Satterley IGNORES COMMON BUSHFIRE EVACUATION IMPACTS such as...

• A bushfire breaking out during nighttime

• People choosing to stay - until the last minute

• Surrounding tight, winding rural roads with loose-gravel sidings, that could be gridlocked by 2000+ vehicles trying to get out – or back into – the bushfire zone.

• Thick, choking, acrid, bushfire smoke that turns day into night

• Road reserves on fire

• Burning embers reigning down – possibly from nearby John Forrest National Park

• Panicked drivers - and their equally panicked passengers, children and animals.

• Car accidents, fallen trees, powerlines blocking those tight rural roads

• Slow moving vehicles towing horse floats, trailers, caravans

• Loose and panicked livestock, horses, kangaroos on roads

• Emergency vehicles accessing / leaving under emergency conditions – against or with the local traffic.

5.  Massive underestimation of emergency vehicles access
Major under-estimations of emergency vehicles: Satterley’s Bushfire Management Plan (Traffic Modelling) allows for only TWO emergency vehicles to be included for each of their traffic modelling zones (13 zones). By contrast – and in reality... 500 firefighters and 95 emergency vehicles attended the 2021 Wooroloo Bushfire in the first three hours - AFAC Independent Operation Review.

6. Aerial water-bombing is not a reliable defence option
Aerial water-bombing is not capable of successfully defending North Stoneville. Aerial water-bombing (including the Boeing 737 FW-LAT) has a 2000 kW m-1 threshold capacity. An Extreme or Catastrophic level bushfire in North Stoneville will generate above that threshold. For example - the intensity of the 2008 Stoneville Bushfire - which started on the actual site of this planned development - and is AGAIN omitted and ignored from Satterley's plans, was measured at 7000 kW m-1, which is 5000kW m-1 above the maximum 2000 kW m-1 aerial firefighting threshold. This bushfire trapped several people in a dam, burned 700 hectares and destroyed four homes. WA has no active night-time aerial water-bombing capability and, like the non-existent East Link, the ‘potential future prospect’ of it cannot be considered, given the risks to people’s lives MUST be balanced against fact - not fiction.

7. Water supply during a bushfire not guaranteed
WA’s Water Corporation stated December 22, 2022: “Mains water supply cannot be guaranteed during a bushfire” - placing the corralled 1001 homes of 2800+ people at great risk given water capacity and pressure to this location will be lower than ‘usual’ suburban subdivisions.

8. Mobile phone communication
Mobile phone communication cannot be relied on during bushfires.

9. High cost to build not included
High costs of building to Bushfire Alert Level (BAL) levels and increasing insurance costs in bushfire risk zones are not included. Recent bushfire and flood disasters in Eastern Australia have rendered some regions un-rebuildable and uninsurable.

10. Schools add evacuation risk
Two planned schools on-site create a bushfire and evacuation risk for 1500 children, teachers, and staff. Hundreds of parents would race to the area causing traffic gridlock and potentially trapping residents trying to escape on just two external bushfire exits. One exit must always be expected to be compromised by the fire or as an emergency vehicle access road. (DFES)

11. Dam water should be a last resort
The plan cites dam water connected to the operation of the proposed WWTP as an available source for bushfire fighting. Hills’ Local Volunteer Bushfire Brigade members say using dam water as a backup in a bushfire emergency is THE LAST RESORT - and most often totally disregarded because dam water can contain rocks and other debris that clog fire-truck pumps and pipes and the content of the water is unknown (causing contamination of the fire truck / pipes, and potentially contamination of private property the water might be used on - even people).

​